University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

12-2015

Comparing the Effectiveness of Individualistic, Altruistic, and
Competitive Incentives in Motivating Completion of Mental
Exercises
Heather Schofield
University of Pennsylvania

George Loewenstein
Jessica Kopsic
Kevin G. Volpp
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers
Part of the Business Commons, Economics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Schofield, H., Loewenstein, G., Kopsic, J., & Volpp, K. G. (2015). Comparing the Effectiveness of
Individualistic, Altruistic, and Competitive Incentives in Motivating Completion of Mental Exercises.
Journal of Health Economics, 44 286-299. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.09.007

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/51
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Comparing the Effectiveness of Individualistic, Altruistic, and Competitive
Incentives in Motivating Completion of Mental Exercises
Abstract
This study examines the impact of individually oriented, purely altruistic, and a hybrid of competitive and
cooperative monetary reward incentives on older adults’ completion of cognitive exercises and cognitive
function. We find that all three incentive structures approximately double the number of exercises
completed during the six-week active experimental period relative to a no incentive control condition.
However, the altruistic and cooperative/competitive incentives led to different patterns of participation,
with significantly higher inter-partner correlations in utilization of the software, as well as greater
persistence once incentives were removed. Provision of all incentives significantly improved performance
on the incentivized exercises. However, results of an independent cognitive testing battery suggest no
generalizable gains in cognitive function resulted from the training.

Keywords
cognitive exercises, incentives, social incentives, behavioral economics, health behaviors

Disciplines
Business | Economics | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/51

Journal of Health Economics 44 (2015) 286–299

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Health Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase

Comparing the effectiveness of individualistic, altruistic, and
competitive incentives in motivating completion of mental exercises夽
Heather Schoﬁeld a,∗ , George Loewenstein b , Jessica Kopsic c , Kevin G. Volpp d
a

Department of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center, 1805 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Baker Hall/Dietrich Hall 319D, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Baker Hall/Dietrich Hall 208, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
d
Center for Health Equity Research and Promotion (CHERP), Philadelphia VA Medical Center, LDI Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics,
Perelman School of Medicine and Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1120 Blockley Hall, 423 Guardian Drive, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
b
c

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 7 June 2014
Received in revised form
23 September 2015
Accepted 25 September 2015
Available online 9 October 2015
JEL classiﬁcation:
D01
D03
I10
I12

a b s t r a c t
This study examines the impact of individually oriented, purely altruistic, and a hybrid of competitive
and cooperative monetary reward incentives on older adults’ completion of cognitive exercises and cognitive function. We ﬁnd that all three incentive structures approximately double the number of exercises
completed during the six-week active experimental period relative to a no incentive control condition.
However, the altruistic and cooperative/competitive incentives led to different patterns of participation,
with signiﬁcantly higher inter-partner correlations in utilization of the software, as well as greater persistence once incentives were removed. Provision of all incentives signiﬁcantly improved performance
on the incentivized exercises. However, results of an independent cognitive testing battery suggest no
generalizable gains in cognitive function resulted from the training.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Keywords:
Cognitive exercises
Incentives
Social incentives
Behavioral economics
Health behaviors

1. Introduction
With a rapidly aging United States population, cognitive decline
is a substantial concern both in terms of population health and
healthcare costs. In recent years, Alzheimer’s disease has become
the sixth most prevalent cause of death in the United States,
accounting for an estimated direct cost of care of approximately
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$150 billion per year (Mebane-Sims, 2009). Further, much of
the cost of overall age-related cognitive decline is a result of
milder forms of decline. By the sixth decade of life, losses in
domains including reaction time, working memory, and attention
are widespread (Bäckman et al., 2006; Park and Payer, 2006; Rogers
and Fisk, 2006). These declines are associated with decrements in
functional performance on instrumental activities of daily living,
such as problem solving and ﬁnancial management (Marsiske and
Margrett, 2006; Finucane et al., 2005; Owsley et al., 2002).
As physical exercise can stave off some of the physical declines
associated with aging, it is possible that cognitive exercises can
reduce the rate of cognitive decline, promote healthy longevity,
and reduce healthcare costs. Despite this potential, research
examining the effectiveness of cognitive exercises in producing
functional improvement on daily tasks or capabilities beyond
performance on the exercises has generally been discouraging
(Jaeggi et al., 2008). However, these disappointing effects may
stem in part from low rates of adherence to training programs
and the lack of cost-effective approaches to improving sustained
and intensive adherence to these regimens. For example, the most

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.09.007
0167-6296/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
0/).
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comprehensive test of cognitive exercises, the ACTIVE study, had
an overall budget of $15 million for 2802 enrolled participants, or
approximately $5000 per participant over 24 months (Ball et al.,
2002).
Individual monetary incentives have proven an effective motivator to promote a variety of healthy behaviors including weight
loss, smoking cessation, adherence to medication regimens, and
physical exercise in younger populations (e.g., Charness and
Gneezy, 2009; Perez et al., 2009; Volpp et al., 2009; Cawley and
Price, 2011; John et al., 2011; Halpern et al., 2015). Yet, little is
known about whether such incentives can effectively promote
engagement with cognitive training among older populations who
may have different discount rates, beliefs about the costs and beneﬁts of the training, and reasons to engage. Additionally, this line
of research faces concerns about the crowd-out of intrinsic motivation to engage in healthy behaviors. One potential force which
could act to counter-balance such effects are social motivations
such as competition and reciprocity (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000;
Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). The importance of peer effects and social motivations in altering behavior has
been documented in a number of domains such as labor supply and
ﬁnancial decision making (Kaur et al., 2010, 2011; Bandiera et al.,
2010; Duﬂo and Saez, 2003).
Social incentives may also be of particular interest in the health
domain and among aging populations because many health behaviors (e.g. eating) have strong social elements and social ties remain
important throughout the lifespan (Lieberman, 2013). Although
evidence within the health domain is limited, two recent studies
coauthored by two of the authors of this paper found beneﬁcial
effects of social incentive programs. In the ﬁrst study, veterans
with poorly managed diabetes were either paid direct incentives
for controlling their diabetes, or were paired with a peer-mentor
whose diabetes had been, but no longer was, poorly controlled.
Although both interventions led to improvement, the peer mentoring program was signiﬁcantly more successful at lower cost (Long
et al., 2012). In the second study, employees were given either
individualistic rewards or organized into small groups in which
joint rewards were allocated to group-members who lost weight.
While the group incentive scheme was signiﬁcantly more effective
in motivating weight loss, it also provided higher rewards ex post,
so it failed to provide a clean comparison of social and non-social
incentives of similar value (Kullgren et al., 2013). No studies that
we are aware of, including the two just noted, have systematically
compared the impact of social and non-social incentives of similar
magnitude on desired health behaviors and, in particular, cognitive
training among older adults.
Incentives that play on social motives could also potentially
enhance cost-effectiveness by providing motivation that is disproportionate to the underlying magnitude of objective incentives.
People will, for example, often reciprocate small gifts, such as the
address labels provided by charities, or the ﬂowers handed out by
Hare Krishnas, with much larger return favors (Cialdini, 2006; Fehr
and Gächter, 2000). Likewise, even in the absence of differential
material incentives, pure completion and the feelings of “winning”
or “losing” can substantially alter behavior and generate signiﬁcant
levels of effort (Delgado et al., 2008). The social forces generated by
teams or groups can also signiﬁcantly increase effort and reduce the
cost to produce a given amount of output (Nalbantian and Schotter,
1997; Babcock et al., 2015). By playing on such non-pecuniary
motives, social incentives have, at least in theory, the potential to
produce more substantial and long-run behavioral changes at lower
cost than individualistic incentives.
Hence, this paper provides a test of the comparative effectiveness of individualistic and socially oriented monetary incentives in
motivating online cognitive training via a randomized controlled
trial among 312 older adults. An online platform was chosen to
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promote engagement with cognitive training due to three key beneﬁts. First, and perhaps most importantly, use of a web-based
cognitive training task facilitates accurate, high frequency data
collection as well as high frequency feedback and incentive provision, features which are often difﬁcult to achieve in research of
this type. For example, studies examining the impact of incentives
on gym usage have generally focused on attendance, measured by
sign-ins; it is much more difﬁcult to monitor how much exercise
participants complete after signing in. Second, the online platform
provides an opportunity to examine the long run impacts of the
provision of incentives for cognitive training with minimal experimental demand effects. In this study, for example, the active study
period in which incentives are provided lasted six weeks. However
participants were given one year of continued access to the cognitive training exercises following the completion of the study, which
made it possible to track continued engagement with the exercises
after the removal of incentives.
Finally, beyond the beneﬁts of accurate measurement of adherence over time, a desirable feature of an online intervention is that,
if found beneﬁcial, it would be much more easily scalable than
most other interventions which have been studied. Scalability is
facilitated due to the ease of replicating a web-based intervention relative to interventions utilizing physical facilities and/or
personnel. More than two-thirds of adults in the United States
have a smart-phone, and older adults are using computers and
smart phones at ever increasing rates (Nielsen, 2014; United States
Census Bureau, 2013; Wagner et al., 2010; Zickuhr and Madden,
2012). Hence, these technologies have the potential to reach individuals of all ages and promote healthy habits, including both
cognitive training and other behaviors, on a daily basis at low cost
and in an automated fashion.
During the six-week active study period participants in all four
conditions, including the Control, were randomly paired and provided access to the cognitive training software including daily
information about the number of exercises completed (and, if relevant, the earnings) by themselves and by their partner. While
access to the software was free in all conditions, participants in the
Control condition did not receive monetary incentives for completing cognitive training exercises. Participants in the three treated
conditions were, however, eligible for additional incentives with
varying structures. In the individual incentives condition, referred
to as the Atomistic treatment, participants were provided with a
ﬂat payment per exercise. In the Altruistic treatment, individuals
were paid as a function of the number of exercises completed by
their partner. In the Cooperative/Competitive treatment, teams of
two were randomly paired to form quads, and each of the teams
was compensated as a positive function of the fraction of the exercises completed by that team and negative function of the fraction
of the exercises completed by the opposing team. The magnitude
of the incentives provided in the three treatment conditions were
designed to be as similar as possible, so as to provide a clean test
of their relative effectiveness in motivating engagement with the
cognitive training. Further details regarding the exact payment
structures are provided in Section 2.4.
We ﬁnd that the use of any monetary incentives, whether
direct or socially motivated, approximately doubled engagement
with the cognitive training exercises. Surprisingly, Altruistic treatment and Cooperative/Competitive treatment (both of which had
much lower average marginal beneﬁt per exercise to the individual
engaging in the exercise) generated gains in the number of exercises completed that are statistically indistinguishable from those
in the Atomistic condition.
Yet despite similar gains in exercises completed across
incentivized treatments, we observe very different patterns of
engagement in pairs of participants across the experimental
treatments. We also found that utilization of the software led
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Table 1
Baseline participant characteristics.

Age
Female
Married
Left handed
Not born in US
Retired
White/Caucasian
Family member
has/had dementia
Normalized cognitive
test score at enrollment
Education
Less than BA
BA
More than BA
Other
Median household income range (USD)
N

All

Control

Atomistic

Altruistic

Cooperative/
Competitive

Current Population
Survey (CPS) (2015)

64.76
(6.40)
0.70
(0.46)
0.61
(0.49)
0.12
(0.33)
0.05
(0.21)
0.61
(0.49)
0.93
(0.26)
0.62
(0.70)
107.32
(7.03)

65.11
(6.74)
0.68
(0.47)
0.61
(0.49)
0.06
(0.25)
0.05
(0.22)
0.61
(0.49)
0.89
(0.32)
0.58
(0.74)
106.81
(7.45)

64.85
(6.98)
0.73
(0.45)
0.56
(0.50)
0.13
(0.34)
0.03
(0.18)
0.63
(0.49)
0.92
(0.27)
0.65
(0.70)
107.49
(6.30)

64.88
(6.16)
0.75
(0.44)
0.52
(0.50)
0.20**
(0.41)
0.03
(0.18)
0.66
(0.48)
0.92
(0.27)
0.67
(0.71)
107.47
(7.48)

64.48
(6.10)
0.68
(0.47)
0.69
(0.47)
0.10
(0.31)
0.06
(0.25)
0.58
(0.50)
0.95
(0.22)
0.60
(0.67)
107.41
(7.00)

67

0.14
0.32
0.48
0.05
50,000–74,999
312

0.15
0.35
0.48
0.02
50,000–74,999
62

0.19
0.26
0.47
0.08
35,000–49,999
62

0.17
0.30
0.45
0.08
50,000–74,999
64

0.10
0.35
0.51
0.05
50,000–74,999
124

0.68
0.15
0.10
Not available
46,080

0.55
0.62
Not available
0.12
0.60
0.85
Not available
Not available

Notes: This table contains the mean and standard deviation of participant characteristics as reported at enrollment. Current Population Survey (CPS) data is approximate
based upon the most relevant information available. Not being born in the US was proxied by being a naturalized citizen or not being a citizen. Being retired was proxied by
not being in the labor force but also not being unemployed.
***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.

to substantial improvements on scores in the majority of the
incentivized exercises, with greater gains among treated individuals. However, the gains did not typically generalize to broader
improvements in measures of cognitive function as captured by
performance on a validated cognitive testing battery examining
three distinct domains of functioning as well as an overall global
measure of functioning.
Finally, to investigate the crowd-out of intrinsic motivation, we
examine utilization of the training software following the completion of the experimental period. Despite dramatic declines across
all experimental groups, there were signiﬁcant differences in the
rate of decline across conditions. During the ﬁve month follow up
period, roughly twice as many exercises were completed by participants in the socially oriented treatments than by participants in
the Atomistic and Control conditions.
2. Experimental design
2.1. Participants
Three hundred and twelve participants between the ages of
ﬁfty-ﬁve and eighty were recruited from adult education classes,
churches, prior unrelated studies, Craig’s List, and community centers in Pittsburgh PA. All participants were screened either in
person or by phone prior to entering the study. Individuals were
excluded from the study if they had a history of stroke, dementia,
Parkinson’s or Huntington’s Disease, Multiple Sclerosis, major psychiatric disorders, or were using medications to enhance cognitive
ability. To participate in the study, individuals had to score at least
26 on the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status-40 (TICS-40)
[roughly equivalent to scoring 27 or above on the Mini-Mental State
Exam (MMSE) (Fong et al., 2009)], to have ﬂuent written and spoken
English, proﬁciency with a computer, internet access, and ability
to attend a training session and testing sessions at the beginning

and end of the active experimental period in the ofﬁce in Pittsburgh, PA. These criteria were chosen to select individuals likely to
be invested in improving cognitive function, while preventing ethical questions and attrition associated with enrolling participants
experiencing cognitive declines or in ill health. Baseline participant
characteristics are presented in Table 1.
With fewer than one in twenty signiﬁcant differences between
conditions, this table suggests that the randomization was successful in producing comparable samples in each of the four conditions.
The ﬁnal column of Table 1 presents comparable values from the
United States population during the same time period. Participants in this study were relatively representative of older adults
on many demographic characteristics such as age and retirement
status. However, participants in this study were, on average, more
educated (80% with a BA or more versus 25% in the population
at large) and higher earning (median income of $50,000–74,999
versus 46,080 in the population generally) (Current Population
Survey (CPS), 2015).
2.2. Experimental timeline and online platform
After being screened and completing the informed consent
process, participants visited the lab and completed an enrollment survey and a 45-min baseline battery of computer-based
cognitive tests utilizing the NeuroTrax software1 . Following the
cognitive testing, participants were randomly paired (and, when
relevant, grouped) and assigned to an experimental condition.
Participants also completed an in-person training session to familiarize them with: (1) the cognitive exercise software, including
the exercises themselves, (2) the website’s messaging features
which allowed them to communicate directly with their partner(s),

1

Additional details regarding this testing battery are provided in Section 2.3.
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Ineligible,
exit
Screening
Eligible,
informed
consent
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Opt-out, exit

Consent,
enrollment survey,
cognive tesng
baery

Six weeks of “acve”
study period with
daily emails and
payment updates
(when applicable).

Cognive
tesng baery,
exit survey,
payment.

Assigned to pair/group
and to experimental
condion. Condion
described in detail to
parcipants. Soware
training administered.

One year
uncompensated
access to soware.
No email
communicaon.

Fig. 1. Participant timeline.

and (3) the information available through the website (their performance, their partner’s performance, and, when relevant, each
person’s earnings). Participants in the treatment groups were also
given extensive instruction, in verbal, mathematical, and graphical form, about the monetary incentive structure to which they
were randomized. During the six-week study period all participants
received free access to the cognitive training software and daily
emails regarding their own and their partner’s/group’s engagement. Earnings information was also provided in these emails for all
conditions except the Control. In addition, all participants, including those in the Control group, could access information regarding
their own use of the software as well as their partner’s use of the
software via the website at any time. This information was updated
in real time. At the end of the study period, participants completed
an alternate version of the cognitive testing battery completed at
intake and an exit survey2 . After the active study period all participants were given continued free access to the cognitive training
software, and usage was monitored; however no further emails
were sent, no information about the partner’s utilization of the software was available, and no further payments were made for use of
the software. Fig. 1 details the participant timeline.

2.3. Cognitive training and cognitive testing software
The exercises used in the training software were provided by
Lumosity, a ﬁrm that provides online cognitive training exercises.
The ﬁrm collaborates with cognitive science researchers from a
variety of well-respected institutions in developing their training
exercises. The ﬁrm also collaborates with researchers to evaluate
their training tools and has found some positive results. However,
the majority of the peer-reviewed evidence has focused on smaller
samples or speciﬁc populations such as chemotherapy treated cancer survivors (e.g., Finn and McDonald, 2011; Kesler et al., 2013)3 .
Yet, over 70 million individuals use this platform, and many other
platforms are also in use around the world. A better understanding of the consequences of sustained training on these activities
among a more typical population provides valuable information

2
The cognitive tests taken at enrollment and the completion of the active experimental period are identical in nature and design, however the stimuli vary between
versions to minimize test-retest effects. Correlation in performance across versions
is very high (see the Neurotrax website for more details).
3
More information is available at www.lumosity.com.

about whether these platforms can be used to improve cognitive
function or stave off cognitive decline.
A subset of 11 exercises drawn from Lumosity’s training materials were used in this study. These exercises targeted ﬁve primary
cognitive domains: spatial orientation, problem solving, memory,
executive function, and reaction time. The average exercise took
approximately 2 to 3 min to complete; however the range in duration was approximately 1 to 10 min depending on the exercise and
the individual’s skill level. To ensure that participants were exposed
to the full range of exercises, the eleven exercises were presented
in a quasi-random order which was changed daily.
The cognitive testing battery used in this study was developed
by NeuroTrax and has been used in over 75 published peerreviewed studies. The battery been validated as a metric to detect
declines in cognitive function among both older adults and the
elderly (Dwolatzky et al., 2003; Doniger et al., 2006). It is able to
signiﬁcantly discriminate between healthy adults and those with
mild cognitive impairment. NeuroTrax discriminability is comparable to traditional testing batteries in memory, attention, motor
skills, processing speed, executive function, visual spatial skills,
and problem solving. The test–retest reliability is also high: r = 0.84
for memory, r = 0.80 for executive function, r = 0.68 for Processing
Speed, and r = 0.79 for attention (Schweiger et al., 2003)4 . These
features make it well suited to study potential changes in functioning resulting from the training regimen in our study. The testing
battery used in this study relied on nine tests focused on memory,
executive function, attention, and processing speed. While reaction
time is not considered a distinct domain in the NeuroTrax testing,
it is used as an underlying metric in processing speed and attention
tests. Due to time constraints during testing, tests explicitly targeting problem solving and spatial reasoning were omitted from the
battery.
After a participant completes the testing battery, the software
generates scores within each cognitive domain tested based on
performance metrics from the underlying tasks. Additionally, the
scores within each domain are averaged into a single “global” cognitive score which serves as a measure of overall performance
on the battery. These scores are normalized according to age and
education speciﬁc values in cognitively healthy individuals. Further details of this process are provided on the NeuroTrax website,
http://www.neurotrax.com.

4

More information is available at http://www.neurotrax.com.
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Table 2
Experimental conditions and payments.
Experimental condition

Description

Payment formula

Control

No payment

Atomistic

Flat rate of $0.17 per exercise completed

Altruistic

Flat rate of $0.17 paid to partner for each
exercise completed

Cooperative/Competitive

Marginal payments vary as a function of exercises by both
teams. Team members earn the same amount.

P1 = 0
P2 = 0
P1 = E1 /6
P2 = E2 /6
P1 = E2 /6
P2 = E1 /6 
P1 = P2 =

P3 = P4 =





(E1 + E2 ) / (E1 + E2 + E3 + E4 )



Max [(E1 + E2 ) , (E3 + E4 )] /6
Max [(E1 + E2 ) , (E3 + E4 )] /6

(E3 + E4 ) / (E1 + E2 + E3 + E4 )

Notes: Ex = exercises completed by partner x, Px = payment to partner x.

2.4. Experimental treatments
Payment formulas for all experimental conditions are presented
in Table 2. Individuals assigned to the Control group were provided with free access to the cognitive training software, messaging
service to communicate with their partner, and emails, but were
not given any monetary incentives to utilize the software. All other
conditions were provided with incentives to complete up to 30
exercises, or roughly 1 h of training, per day. An hour of training
was targeted to encourage a level of training high enough to detect
effects on cognitive function, should one exist, while capping incentivized involvement at a length of time judged to be potentially
sustainable5 .
The maximum daily earnings in all treated conditions was $5.
This value was chosen primarily based on the values provided
in other studies which successfully promoted preventive health
behaviors (e.g., see reviews by Marteau et al., 2009; DeFulio and
Silverman, 2012; Jeffery, 2012). However, given the range of payments proven successful in the literature and the variety of tasks
involved, some discretion was required. Hence, the total daily
compensation of $5 was arrived at by balancing a level which participants were likely to ﬁnd motivating given the time commitment,
but which could still be ﬁnancially sustainable in the context of
wellness programs.
Given the maximum payment of $5, participants in the Atomistic treatment were provided with a ﬂat rate monetary incentive
of approximately $0.17 per exercise for completing up to 30 exercises. Participants in the Altruistic treatment were compensated at
the same rate of $0.17 per exercise. However, their compensation
depended on the number of exercises completed by their partner
rather than of their own level of participation. Hence, while participants in this treatment could potentially improve their cognitive
health via the training, they received no direct ﬁnancial beneﬁt
from completing additional exercises.
Finally, participants in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment
were paired with a partner to form a team, and two pairs/teams
were matched to form a group of four. The incentives in this treatment were designed to encourage cooperation between members
of the teams and competition between the teams. To accomplish
this, individuals in this treatment were compensated as a function
of both the relative level of participation between the two teams
and the total number of exercises completed by the team with
the highest level of participation. Speciﬁcally, the total amount of
money available to be distributed among the group of four was

5
Ball et al. (2002) present one of the few examples of a successful cognitive training intervention in older adults. We base our estimated required training on this
example. Training in this study consisted of 10 sessions lasting 60–75 min conducted over 5 to 6 weeks. However, participants in this study trained only one
cognitive domain. Participants in our study trained on multiple domains, with some
tasks training multiple domains simultaneously. Hence, we targeted roughly similar
overall levels of training per domain.

the maximum number of exercises completed by either team multiplied by $0.34. The money was then allocated between the two
teams in direct proportion to the number of exercises completed
by each team. Each member of a team/pair received the same
compensation for a given day. This design provides a strictly positive marginal payment for the individual completing the activity
and also for their partner (up to the 30 exercise per participant
limit, consistent with the other treatments). However, the marginal
payment for one exercise by one member of the team varied signiﬁcantly and ranged from less than $0.01 to $0.17 per partner based on
the performance of both teams6 . Due to the fact that the payment
from each exercise is split between members of the team, individuals in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment receive a weakly
lower payment per exercise for themselves than individuals in the
Atomistic treatment. But, to keep the total possible payments the
same, this difference is compensated for by the fact that when an
individual’s partner completes an exercise, that individual receives
a payment without having completed any exercises. This structure
encouraged cooperation among team members (each team member’s work beneﬁts the other; both had to participate to get the
maximum possible earnings), but competition between the two
teams (once the maximum number of exercises was reached by
either team the payments became zero-sum across the group).
3. Results
3.1. Completion of exercises
There is a large main effect of treatment on engagement with
the cognitive exercises. Individuals in the no payment Control completed an average of 11.7 exercises per day (roughly 30 min of
daily engagement with the software). Individuals in each of the
treatment groups completed approximately twice that number, a
large and statistically signiﬁcant increase (see Table 3 and Fig. 2)7 .
The increase in engagement in the treatment groups is statistically
indistinguishable across the three treatment arms, with an average
of 23.1, 22.4, and 25.5 exercises per day for the Atomistic, Altruistic,

6
Note that a marginal payment of $0.34 for the team as a whole is a marginal
payment of $0.17 for each member of the team. Marginal payments are high when
one team has not completed any exercises but the other team has not yet reached
the 30 exercise per participant limit so the total amount available is growing but is
only allocated to one team. On the other hand, marginal payments are low when one
team has completed the maximum incentivized number of exercises and the other
has completed very few because the total amount to be distributed does not grow
when the low playing team engages, but the fraction reallocated toward the low
engagement team is small. Despite the variability in the marginal payments in this
condition, the median payment per exercise per team in this condition was $0.17.
7
As expected given the well-balanced randomization, results were qualitatively
similar with and without controlling for baseline characteristics. Hence, additional
covariates are omitted to simplify regression results. All regressions were clustered
at the level of the pair for the Control, Atomistic, and Altruistic conditions and
at the level of the group (two teams each consisting of a pair) for the Cooperative/Competitive condition.
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Table 3
Exercises per day.
Atomistic
Altruistic
Cooperative/Competitive
Constant
R-squared
N

11.39***
(2.15)
10.70***
(2.55)
13.76***
(1.68)
11.72***
(1.32)
0.11
13,104

0

5

Mean Number of Exercises
15
20
25
10

30

Notes: This table reports the OLS regression of the number of exercises completed
on indicator variables for each experimental condition. The unit of observation is
the participant-day. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the pair for all
experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at the level
of the group.
***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.

Control

Atomistic
Altruistic
Experimental Group

Coop/Compet

Fig. 2. Mean number of cognitive exercises per day.

Atomistic, and Cooperative/Competitive groups, respectively. This
result is particularly striking given that participants in the Altruistic and Cooperative/Competitive conditions received signiﬁcantly
lower direct beneﬁts for completing exercises than individuals in
the Atomistic treatment. Direct payments to the individual completing the exercise in the Atomistic condition strictly dominate those
of individuals in the Altruistic condition, who receive zero direct
beneﬁt, and weakly dominate those of individuals in the Cooperative/Competitive condition, who receive a median payment
roughly half as large as those in the Atomistic condition due to the
fact that the same marginal payment in split across the members
of the team8 .
Given that both frequency and intensity of exercise may play
a role in generating improvements in cognitive function, we also
investigate the potential margins of adjustment underlying this
dramatic overall increase in the number of exercises completed to
determine whether the incentives were effective at increasing both
these margins. Reassuringly, the results indicate that the increase
is due to the combined effect of both extensive margin changes (i.e.
more regular use of the software) and intensive margin changes
(i.e. greater participation conditional on logging into the website).

8
While the marginal payment in the Cooperative/Competitive condition was variable, and depended on the level of utilization of both teams, the mean payment per
exercise per team ($0.23) was quite similar and the median payment per exercise
per team ($0.17) was nearly identical to the other compensated treatments. However, the fact that this total marginal payment is split equally across the members of
the team results in direct payments to the individual completing the exercise about
half as large as those in the Atomistic condition.
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Distributional information for the number of exercises completed
is presented in Table 4. Individuals in the Control group logged in
65.8 percent of the days while participants in the Altruistic, Atomistic, and Cooperative/Competitive groups logged on 81.0 percent,
80.3 percent, and 87.5 percent of the days, respectively. Conditional
on logging in and completing any exercises, the mean number of
exercises completed in each group was 17.8 (Control), 27.7 (Atomistic), 28.8 (Altruistic), and 29.1 (Cooperative/Competitive). Hence,
in addition to the large impact on daily use of the software, the
treatments dramatically increased the number of exercises completed once logged in.
As shown in Figs. 3a–d and Fig. 4, the higher average completion of exercises in the treatment groups is driven in large part
by the substantial fraction of individuals completing exactly the
maximum number of incentivized exercises, 30. While the most
immediately striking feature of these ﬁgures is the large mass
of individuals completing exactly 30 exercises in the treatment
groups, the treatments increased the number of individuals completing more than the monetarily incentivized number of activities.
Speciﬁcally, the treatment raised the fraction of participant-days
above 30 exercises from 9.0 percent in the Control group to 19.2
percent, 21.4 percent, and 28.7 percent of the Altruistic, Atomistic,
and Cooperative/Competitive groups, respectively.
Although the incentives offered in the three treatment groups
had similarly large main effects on the average number of exercises completed per day, treatment assignments had differential
impacts on the within-pair patterns of engagement, varying in
accordance with the degree to which incentives depended on the
behavior of the person with whom the participant was paired. Individuals assigned to the Control group have no ﬁnancial interaction
or interdependency; however play between partners is still correlated (r = 0.15, p = 0.09), providing evidence for modest peer effects
resulting purely from the daily emails regarding how many exercises were completed by each member of the pair. In the Atomistic
treatment in which ﬁnancial rewards are again unrelated to the
partner’s engagement, the correlation between partner’s daily use
of the software is very similar (r = 0.12, p = 0.25). In the Altruistic
and Cooperative/Competitive treatments, however, in which ﬁnancial rewards are contingent on one’s partner’s play, the correlation
between partners increases to 0.36 (p < 0.01) and 0.22 (p = 0.01),
respectively.
In addition to these simple correlations, a number of other interesting patterns of concordance were generated by the social and
ﬁnancial incentives of the treatment arms. Column (1) of Table 5
displays results from a linear probability regression examining the
probability that an individual completes zero exercises as a function of their treatment group, binary variables indicating whether
their partner completed zero exercises that day or the previous
day, and treatment interacted with the binary variables. Column
(2) presents similar results with binary variables for completing
at least 30 exercises. Both the current day and lagged interaction
terms are strongly positive and signiﬁcant for the Altruistic condition indicating that individuals in this condition were more likely
than individuals in the Control group to complete zero (30 or more
exercises) if their partner did the same on either the current day or
the previous day. Of further interest is the fact that, for the Altruistic treatment, the point estimate for lagged positive reciprocity is
substantially larger, although not statistically distinguishable from,
negative reciprocity. Negative reciprocity may be mitigated by the
fact that the exercises are intended to promote health, encouraging
engagement even in the absence of ﬁnancial remuneration.
To further examine these spillovers and their evolution over
time, we regress the number of exercises completed by the individual on their partner’s exercise completion that day and the
previous three days as well as treatment assignment in a fully interacted model. (See online Appendix A for regression, Table A1. Fig. 5
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Table 4
Summary statistics of daily completion of exercises.
Control

Atomistic

Altruistic

Cooperative/Competitive

Percentile
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th
95th
99th

0
0
9
20
30
35
50

0
10
30
30
32
35
56

0
10
30
30
32
37
94

0
21
30
31
33
37
60

Mean
SD

11.72
12.67

23.12
15.03

22.43
17.65

25.48
12.86

Correlation with partner
Mean percent of days logging on
Mean exercises if exercises >0

0.15
65.78
17.82

0.12
80.30
28.79

0.36
80.92
27.72

0.22
87.50
29.14

Atomistic

0

0

Percentage of Participant-Days
30
50
10
20
40

Percentage of Participant-Days
30
10
20
40
50

60

60

Control

0

10

20

30

40
50
60
Exercises per day

70

80

90

0

100

10

20

40
50
60
Exercises per day

70

80

90

100

80

90

100

Cooperative/Competitive

Percentage of Participant-Days
10
20
30
40
50

0

0

Percentage of Participant-Days
10
40
20
30
50

60

60

Altruistic

30

0

10

20

30

40
50
60
Exercises per day

70

80

90

100

0

10

20

30

40
50
60
Exercises per day

70

Fig. 3. Cognitive exercises per day by experimental condition.

summarizes the results from this regression.) The point estimates
of all contemporaneous and lagged effects are positive and most are
signiﬁcantly different from zero. Initially (contemporaneous effects
and one lag), reciprocity effects are greatest in the Altruistic condition followed by the Cooperative/Competitive condition. By two
periods (days) back, however, the effects are small and indistinguishable across conditions despite remaining positive.
Building on this analysis, we investigate these reciprocity effects
over time in the study. Fig. 6, which displays the between-partner
correlation in daily exercises by study week, shows that these
reciprocity effects grew stronger over the course of the six week
intervention period in the Altruistic and Cooperative/Competitive
conditions in which payoffs were interdependent. In contrast, the
correlation between partners’ play declined over time in the Control condition and remained fairly stable, but low, in the Atomistic
treatment condition.

3.2. Performance on cognitive exercises
Participants in all experimental treatments signiﬁcantly
improved their performance on ten of the eleven cognitive exercises included in the software (see Table 6, Panel A). Even in the
Control group, improvements in performance were substantial in
magnitude, typically between 3/4 and 1 standard deviation. The
doubling of exercises completed by individuals in the treatment
groups generated an additional marginal improvement of roughly
1/4 to 1/2 standard deviations on approximately half of the 11
exercises. The differential gains were largest in exercises focusing
on executive function, speed/reaction time, and spatial orientation
(Table 6 also indicates which exercises, numbered from 1 to 11, target each of the cognitive domains. Exercise 2 is co-categorized in
both Reaction Time and Spatial Reasoning. Fig. 7 presents these
changes in performance by cognitive domain). Although these
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Table 5
Probability of completing zero/more than thirty exercises.
Column 2
≥30 exercises

Column 1
0 exercises
−0.17*
(0.07)
−0.24***
(0.07)
−0.26***
(0.06)
−0.06
(0.05)
0.05
(0.09)
0.28***
(0.08)
0.18*
(0.07)
−0.00
(0.05)
0.05
(0.10)
0.17*
(0.08)
0.08
(0.07)
0.36***
(0.06)
13,104
0.07

Atomistic
Altruistic
Cooperative/Competitive
Partnert = 0 (binary)
Atomistic × Partnert = 0
Altruistic × Partnert = 0
Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert = 0
Partnert−1 = 0 (binary)
Atomistic × Partnert−1 = 0
Altruistic × Partnert−1 = 0
Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert−1 = 0
Constant (Control)
N
R2

0.46***
(0.11)
0.04
(0.05)
0.34***
(0.09)
0.08
(0.04)
0.00
(0.08)
0.30***
(0.06)
0.11
(0.07)
0.03
(0.06)
0.03
(0.10)
0.32***
(0.07)
0.15
(0.08)
0.11***
(0.03)
13,104
0.33

Atomistic
Altruistic
Cooperative/Competitive
Partnert ≥ 30 (binary)
Atomistic × Partnert ≥ 30
Altruistic × Partnert ≥ 30
Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert ≥ 30
Partnert−1 ≥ 30 (binary)
Atomistic × Partnert−1 ≥ 30
Altruistic × Partnert−1 ≥ 30
Cooperative/Competitive × Partnert−1 ≥ 30
Constant (Control)
N
R2

Notes: This table examines positive and negative reciprocity between partners (pairs in the Cooperative/Competitive condition) in each of the experimental conditions. Column
(1) reports the results of a linear probability model regressing an indicator for whether an individual completes zero exercises on indicators for experimental condition, an
indicator for whether their partner completed zero exercises that day and whether their partner completed zero exercises the previous day, and those indicators interacted
with each experimental treatment. Column (2) has the same general design but presents the probability of completing at least 30 exercises. The unit of observation is the
participant-day. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at the level of the group.
***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 6
Changes in normalized scores on cognitive exercises.
Cognitive domain

Spatial

Executive function

Memory

Problem solving

Reaction time
Exercise number
Panel A
Treated
Constant (Control)
N
R2
Panel B
Treated
Total Exercises
(00s)
Total Exercises
(00s) Squared
Constant (Control)
N
R2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

0.26*
(0.14)
1.08***
(0.12)
294
0.01

0.45***
(0.12)
0.96***
(0.10)
293
0.04

0.31**
(0.13)
0.81***
(0.11)
294
0.02

0.39***
(0.13)
1.06***
(0.12)
294
0.03

0.37***
(0.14)
1.13***
(0.12)
293
0.02

0.30***
(0.10)
0.74***
(0.07)
294
0.02

0.07
(0.14)
0.07
(0.11)
293
0

−0.02
(0.16)
0.42***
(0.14)
293
0

−0.04
(0.09)
0.75***
(0.07)
293
0

−0.02
(0.12)
0.75***
(0.11)
294
0

0.28*
(0.14)
0.79***
(0.12)
292
0.01

−0.02
(0.15)
0.09***
(0.02)
−0.002***
(0.001)
0.71***
(0.15)
294
0.06

0.06
(0.12)
0.12***
(0.02)
−0.003***
(0.001)
0.44***
(0.12)
293
0.15

−0.08
(0.13)
0.12***
(0.02)
−0.003**
(.001)
0.29***
(0.11)
294
0.13

−0.03
(0.13)
0.13***
(0.02)
−0.003***
(0.001)
0.50***
(0.12)
294
0.16

−0.12
(0.14)
0.17***
(0.02)
−0.004***
(0.001)
0.44***
(0.12)
293
0.21

0.00
(0.10)
0.10***
(0.02)
−0.002***
(0.001)
0.34***
(0.10)
294
0.11

−0.05
(0.17)
0.06**
(0.02)
−0.002***
(0.001)
−0.15
(0.14)
293
0.02

−0.13
(0.19)
0.08***
(0.03)
−0.003***
(0.001)
0.16
(0.17)
293
0.02

−0.21**
(0.09)
0.05**
(0.02)
0.001
(0.001)
0.54***
(0.10)
293
0.03

−0.26**
(0.13)
0.06***
(0.02)
−0.001**
(0.001)
0.46***
(0.11)
294
0.04

−0.11
(0.14)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.002
(0.001)
0.28***
(0.14)
292
0.12

Notes: Panel A reports results of OLS regressions of changes in scores on each cognitive exercise, as deﬁned below, on an indicator for “Treatment” which includes all individuals
in the Atomistic, Altruistic, and Cooperative/Competitive conditions. Panel B contains the results of OLS regressions of the same dependent variable on an indicator for
treatment, the total exercises completed by each participant over the experimental period, and the square of that total. Scores for each exercise are normalized to a mean
of zero and standard deviation of one. Changes are deﬁned as the last score–ﬁrst score, conditional on having completed an exercise at least twice during the experimental
period. Results are qualitatively similar using averages of the last three scores–ﬁrst three scores. Results are also similar examining indicators for each treatment rather than
grouping all treatments together. The unit of observation is the participant. Although some exercises train multiple domains simultaneously, exercises are categorized into
primary cognitive domains as indicated by Lumosity, the company providing the software. Exercise number 2 has strong spatial reasoning and reaction time components
and hence is included in both categories. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at
the level of the group.
***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Atomistic

Altruistic

Coop/Team

Reaction Time

Spatial

Exec. Funct. Problem Solving

Memory

Cognitive Domain
0 Exercises
30 Exercises

1 to 29 Exercises
>30 Exercises

Fig. 4. Mean number of days completing N exercises.

Fig. 5. Conditional correlations between partners.

Fig. 6. Between partner correlation in exercises completed.

estimates suggest decreasing marginal returns to additional
exercises, the differential gains still represent substantial improvements on these exercises for treated individuals.
The improvements in scores on the exercises are mediated by
the increase in the number of exercises completed (see Table 6,
Panel B). Each additional 100 exercises is associated with a gain of
approximately 0.05 to 0.2 standard deviations. However, congruent
with the results presented in Panel A, the negative coefﬁcients on
the squared terms indicate diminishing marginal returns.
Given that the number of exercises (i.e. quantity) is incentivized
rather than the scores on the exercises (i.e. “quality”), it is possible the design of the incentives could encourage participants
to strategically substitute quantity of engagement for quality of

Control

Treated

Fig. 7. Mean normalized gains in exercise scores by cognitive domain.

engagement in order to maximize their rewards. If this substitution
occurred, it would limit the potential cognitive beneﬁts of training.
Table 6 Panel B allows us to examine whether this occurred by
testing whether receiving ﬁnancial incentives impacts scores on
the exercises, conditional on the number of exercises completed.
To be explicit, because improvements in scores are a function of
both practice (the number of exercises completed) and “quality”
or concentration per exercise, if treated individuals exerted less
cognitive effort per exercise we would expect treated individuals to
obtain lower scores conditional on the amount of practice (number
of exercises). Hence, if substitution from quality to quantity occurs
we would expect that the regression coefﬁcients on the Treatment
indicator to be negative.
As can be seen in Table 6 Panel B, nine of the eleven coefﬁcients
on the Treated variable are insigniﬁcant, suggesting no or minimal substitution toward quantity over “quality” of engagement
among those exercises. Two coefﬁcients [columns (9) and (10)]
are, however, statistically signiﬁcant and negative. These signiﬁcant coefﬁcients occur in exercises in which the duration of the
exercise increases substantially with improved performance.
Speciﬁcally, while the majority of exercises were of ﬁxed
duration, a small number of exercises increased in duration as performance improved (e.g. a certain number of mistakes are granted
before the game ends, so as performance improves and the fraction of rounds with a mistake declines, the duration of the game
increases). The games in Columns (9) and (10) exhibited this feature and ranged in duration from roughly 2 to 10 min per exercise,
roughly 1 to 5 times the duration of a “typical” exercise. Hence,
the incentive to shift from quality to quantity on these exercises
was higher given the additional time costs of quality improvement.
Correspondingly, there is greater substitution away from quality on
these two exercises. For these 2 exercises, the magnitude of the performance decline driven by incentivizing quantity is approximately
equivalent to the expected decline in performance corresponding to completing 9 to 10 fewer exercises per day9 . In short, in
circumstances in which the exercises become much more taxing
as participants improve, there is evidence of substitution toward

9
For example, in column (9) each additional 100 exercises completed over the
course of the study increases average performance on the task by 0.05 standard
deviations (the coefﬁcient on “Total exercises,” the coefﬁcient on the quadratic term
is small enough not to exert substantial inﬂuence). Being treated with any incentives
decreases performance by −0.21 standard deviations (the coefﬁcient on “Treated”).
So, being treated is roughly equivalent to completing 400 fewer games over the 6
week study, or completing about 9.5 fewer games per day.

H. Schoﬁeld et al. / Journal of Health Economics 44 (2015) 286–299

10

Section 2.3 provides additional details regarding this cognitive testing battery.
11
Results of a two stage least squares regression using treatment as an instrument
for the number of exercises completed provide similar results.
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Fig. 8. Mean exercises per day by treatment group.
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2

2.5

moderate decline in engagement with the software during the sixweek experimental period (except in the Cooperative/Competitive
treatment), there was a large and immediate decline in all experimental conditions at the conclusion of the study. In fact, the average
total number of exercises completed per participant in the ﬁve
months following the completion of the study was only 84, or
approximately 0.5 exercise per day. This low level of engagement
is in sharp contrast to the previous overall average of 21.6 exercises
per day during the active experimental period.
However, a post-hoc analysis comparing the average number
of exercises between socially oriented and individually oriented
treatments reveals that individuals in the socially oriented incentive conditions completed nearly twice as many exercises (103 in
Cooperative/Competitive and 98 in Altruistic) as individuals in the
individually oriented conditions (58 in Control and 57 in Atomistic).
The difference between the Cooperative/Competitive and Altruistic
treatments and the Atomistic and Control treatments is marginally
signiﬁcant (p = 0.06) during the ﬁrst month, but becomes insigniﬁcant as the treatments converge over time (see Fig. 9).
The large standard errors on these estimates are due to substantial variation in the level of software utilization after the end
of the active experimental period. The fraction of individuals who
never log onto the software again after the active experimental
period ended is relatively constant across experimental conditions,
ranging from 39 percent to 42 percent. However, approximately
7 percent of individuals continue to engage at meaningful levels
(>5 exercises per day on average) for at least a month, and 77

.5

One of the most signiﬁcant challenges in changing healthrelated behaviors is to maintain the behavior changes over time.
During the six weeks of the active study period there was a small
but statistically signiﬁcant decline in the number of exercises completed in the Control, Atomistic, and Altruistic conditions. The effect
amounted to a decline of approximately 3.3 exercises per day over
the course of six weeks, in a fairly linear trend of approximately
0.5 exercise per week. There was no decline in engagement in the
Cooperative/Competitive treatment (see Fig. 8).
At the conclusion of the six-week experimental period, participants were given continued access to the software; however the
monetary rewards and daily information about their own and their
partner’s engagement with the software ceased. In contrast to the

1

0

3.4. Time trends

Mean Exercises per Day

Although individuals in the treatment groups typically had
greater improvement on scores on the training exercises, individuals in the incentive conditions did not show greater improvement
on scores on the cognitive testing battery over the course of the
six-week study as compared with the Control group (see Table 7
Panel A).
There are universal improvements, deﬁned as the difference
between exit score and baseline score, across all experimental
groups in the cognitive testing battery10 . However, as can be seen
in Table 7 Panel B, these improvements may be at least partially
due to a test–retest effect. While Processing Speed is signiﬁcantly
correlated with the number of exercises completed even after a
Bonferroni correction, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between
the number of exercises completed and improvements on the cognitive testing battery for the overall cognitive score or three of the
four cognitive domains11 .
An alternative explanation consistent with these results is that
even the lower levels of training done by the Control group can
be highly efﬁcacious in increasing scores on this testing battery.
However, the improvement of those individuals in the bottom
decile of exercises per day (approximately 4 or fewer exercises
per day, or fewer than one exercise per day in each domain) is
statistically indistinguishable from that of individuals in the top
decile of exercises per day (more than 31 exercises per day). Hence,
the improvements from the training would need to be highly
non-linear (i.e. all of the beneﬁts accrue from the completing the
ﬁrst exercise or two) for this explanation to hold, suggesting that
a test–retest effect is the more likely explanation driving these
results.
Finally, it is also possible that this particular cognitive assessment failed to capture changes generated by the training or that
additional training is necessary to detect effects on this test. However, the validation of the testing battery, as described in Section
2.3, suggests this is also unlikely to fully explain these results.
Hence, despite the fact that the incentives were effective in generating high levels of sustained engagement and substantial gains on
the trained exercises, these cognitive testing results are consistent
with a large number of other studies which point to limited or no
improvement on general cognitive tasks which are not speciﬁcally
trained (Jaeggi et al., 2008).

Mean Exercises per Day

3.3. Performance on cognitive testing battery

30

quantity over quality; however, this substitution appears to have
been minimal overall.
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Fig. 9. Post experimental period exercises.
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Table 7
Changes in NeuroTrax cognitive testing scores by domain.
Cognitive domain
Panel A
Treated
Constant
(Control)
N
R2
Panel B
Total exercises
(00s)
Constant
N
R2

Global

Memory

Executive function

Attention

Processing speed

0.03
(0.76)
4.29***
(0.70)
310
0.00

−0.38
(0.95)
2.38***
(0.83)
310
0.00

0.13
(1.38)
2.80**
(1.24)
310
0.00

0.02
(0.99)
2.73***
(0.91)
310
0.00

0.31
(1.35)
9.22***
(1.22)
308
0.00

0.06
(0.05)
3.81***
(0.62)
310
0.00

−0.01
(0.08)
2.16***
(0.81)
310
0.00

0.01
(0.09)
2.78***
(1.02)
310
0.00

−0.01
(0.08)
2.81***
(0.82)
310
0.00

0.25***
(0.10)
7.16***
(1.01)
308
0.02

Notes: This table reports on changes in the cognitive testing scores from enrollment to the end of the active experimental period. Each column in Panel A is an OLS regression of
the change in score within the cognitive domain indicated at the top of each column on an indicator (Treated) for belonging to Atomistic, Altruistic, or Cooperative/Competitive
condition. The change in score is deﬁned as the normalized score at the end of the active experimental period score minus the normalized enrollment score. Panel B includes
OLS regressions of the change in score on the total number of exercises completed by the participant during the active experimental period. The testing battery used in this
study is a validated battery with high reliability. The battery, produced by NeuroTrax, is based on nine cognitive tests focused on memory, executive function, attention, and
processing speed. These underlying tests are used to produce aggregate performance metrics within a domain, as well as an overall “global” score which averages across the
domains being tested. While reaction time is not considered a distinct domain in the NeuroTrax testing, it is used as an underlying metric in processing speed and attention
tests. Due to time constraints during testing, tests explicitly targeting problem solving and spatial reasoning were omitted from the battery. Additional information on the
testing battery is provided in Section 2.3 of the text. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which
is clustered at the level of the group.
***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level,
**
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.

percent of these individuals are in the Cooperative/Competitive
and Altruistic treatments, a pattern of difference that persists,
albeit more weakly, after the ﬁrst month. Hence, these results suggest that the more socially oriented treatments enhance intrinsic
motivation more (or detract from it less) than more individually
oriented treatments, at least for a subset of the population.

4. Discussion
In this experiment, all three types of monetary incentives, whether direct or socially motivated, approximately
doubled engagement with the cognitive training exercises.
Strikingly, the altruistically motivated incentives and the Cooperative/Competitive incentives (both of which had much lower
average marginal beneﬁt per exercise to the individual engaging in
the exercise) generated gains in the number of exercises completed
that are statistically indistinguishable from the direct monetary
incentives in the Atomistic condition. The dramatic increase in the
average number of exercises completed each day was the result of
gains on both the extensive and intensive margins, with individuals in the treatments logging in on a larger fraction of the days
and completing more exercises conditional on logging in.
Despite the fact that the gains in utilization of the software
were statistically indistinguishable across the incentivized treatments, the patterns of engagement with the software among
paired participants were strikingly different across the experimental treatments. While pairs of participants in the Control and
Atomistic treatments exhibited modest correlations in exercises
completed each day, suggesting the existence of spillovers purely
from the information provided about the partner’s use of the
software, the correlation between partners in the Altruistic and
Cooperative/Competitive conditions was both much higher and
increased over time.
The consistent and high levels of utilization of the software led
to meaningful improvements on the majority of the incentivized
exercises; these gains were typically 0.75 to 1 standard deviation in
the Control group and 1 to 1.5 standard deviations in the Treatment

groups. Although there were also substantial gains on a cognitive
testing battery administered at enrollment and again at week six,
the gains did not differ substantially between Control and Treatment groups or those in the top and bottom decile of exercise
completion, suggesting that the effects may be driven primarily by
a test–retest effect. This ﬁnding, which is suggestive of limited generalizability of cognitive changes, is consistent with a wide range of
previous studies examining the impact of ‘brain exercises’ on generalized cognitive function despite the high levels of engagement
over the six-week training period in our study (Jaeggi et al., 2008).
Following the conclusion of the experimental period, utilization of the software declined dramatically across all experimental
groups. However, the decline was attenuated slightly in the Altruistic and Cooperative/Competitive conditions. Individuals in these
groups completed nearly twice as many exercises in the ﬁrst month
following the cessation of the intervention as individuals in the
Control or Atomistic treatments. This result points to the possibility that the social forces generated by those treatments led to
less crowding out, or more crowding in, of intrinsic motivation.
These differences between conditions in post-incentive engagement, however, disappeared by the end of the second month
following the removal of incentives. Hence, although social forces
may promote intrinsic motivation to engage with training, more
work is needed to understand how to amplify these effects and
increase their longevity.
Although the sample of 312 participants was moderate, the high
levels of utilization of the cognitive training software during the
study were striking and quite clearly robust. It is possible, with
a larger sample, that signiﬁcant differences might have emerged
between treatment groups, but our sample size was chosen to be
large enough that clinically meaningful differences would be likely
to emerge. Indeed some differences, e.g., in relationships of engagement between partners as well as differences in persistence once
incentives were removed, did emerge, and were signiﬁcant.
While the population studied was likely to be particularly motivated, a fact demonstrated by the substantial utilization even
among individuals in the Control group, ﬁnancial and social incentives still resulted in large increases in the number of exercises
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completed. The high initial motivation of the participants may
moderate generalizability of the magnitude of the effects; if these
incentive conditions were implemented in a population that was
not intrinsically motivated to do cognitive training, it is possible
that the impact of the incentives would be more modest. However,
the opposite is also possible, since control participants in such an
implementation would also be less motivated.
Additionally, the relatively high levels of education of the study
population may also have inﬂuenced the participants’ reactions to
incentives. However, the direction of this effect is also ambiguous.
It is possible that more educated individuals may either be more
attentive to or better understand the incentives or place a higher
value on maintaining strong cognitive skills, leading them to react
more strongly. On the other hand, it is also possible that people
with greater education would believe there is less need to engage
in cognitive training, or that the high correlation between education and lifetime income would moderate the impact of the modest
monetary rewards. Although this effect is ambiguous, the fact that
incentives improved engagement from already high levels suggests
that these types of socially oriented monetary incentives do have
the potential to promote engagement both with further studies of
alternative cognitive training methods and in those of other health
behaviors.
The scalability of the online platform complements the scope
of the socially oriented interventions, both in terms of facilitating
further research and in terms of possible use in wellness programs or other contexts in which healthy behavior changes are
promoted. From the perspective of study participants or individuals
considering whether or not to join a wellness program, web-based
platforms have the potential to greatly reduce costs and promote
active engagement.
Further, in terms of future research, the online platform,
and in particular the cognitive training exercises, offer a unique
opportunity to gather accurate high frequency data with minimal experimental demand. This feature is important for two key
reasons. First, although results of this training regimen did not generalize substantially over the period studied, research to determine
how to forestall cognitive decline is still of paramount importance.
Alzheimer’s disease is not only the sixth most common cause of
death, but accounts for an estimated direct costs of care of approximately $150 billion per year in the United States (Mebane-Sims,
2009). Mild cognitive impairment and other less severe forms of
cognitive decline further add to this enormous cost and loss of
healthy years of life. This burden will only increase with an aging
population. The total costs of dementia in the United States are
expected to climb to between 300 billion and 615 billion by 2040
(Hurd et al., 2013). Hence, while few cognitive training programs
to date have proven successful, further study of creative programs
design to forestall these declines remains essential. This platform
and similar incentives may serve as an ideal venue for further study
in this area by promoting substantially higher rates of sustained
engagement with alternative training regimens.
Second, and more broadly, although prior research examining
the impact of monetary incentives on other health-related behaviors has yielded a number of interesting ﬁndings, this research has
often been stymied by poor measures of incentivized behaviors. For
example, in studies examining monetary incentives for gym attendance, attendance has been measured by card-swipes (e.g., Acland
and Levy, 2015; Charness and Gneezy, 2009). However, it is unclear
whether the individual actually completed any exercise or simply
swiped the card to receive the promised rewards. A variety of other
health behaviors such as medication adherence face similar challenges. Some studies have addressed behaviors with more directly
veriﬁable outcomes such as weight loss or smoking cessation, but
it is difﬁcult to measure these behaviors with high frequency and
accuracy in many settings, limitations that likely diminish the
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effectiveness of incentives. Online cognitive training addresses
these concerns by accurately capturing exactly how much exercise
was completed and by providing high frequency data that can be
used to provide rapid accurate feedback and incentives.
Although the positive, and generally comparable, effects of the
different incentive schemes on participant engagement might seem
to suggest that all that matters is whether engagement is incentivized, the different patterns of engagement produced by the
various incentive schemes suggest that the incentive designs may
be more or less appropriate for different health related behaviors.
For example, in activities where individuals can “fall off the bandwagon” easily, altruistic designs may provide discouraging results
because when one team member fails and is unable to get back on
track there are likely to be negative spillovers to the other team
member. The same is true of the Cooperative/Competitive condition. The higher correlation in behaviors between pairs in the
two conditions involving social incentives is, thus, a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, each of these conditions may have been
successful in channeling powerful social motives to the goal of
motivating people to engage in cognitive exercises. On the other
hand, the same connectedness between the players also introduces
hazards in terms of likely non-engagement if one of the players
drops out. This could happen for reasons that have nothing to do
with lack of motivation, such as vacations, work, or lack of internet
access but nevertheless effectively demotivate the other member of
a pair. These are important factors to take into account when deciding what types of incentives to introduce in a particular setting.
In sum, although the diverse incentive schemes examined in
this study were successful in substantially increasing older adults’
engagement with online cognitive exercises, and this engagement
produced signiﬁcant improvements in performance on the exercises themselves, these improvements did not appear to generalize
beyond the incentivized exercises. While these results are disappointing given the urgent need for strategies to forestall cognitive
decline in aging populations, the research does provide empirical
support for the efﬁcacy of ﬁnancial and social incentives in motivating engagement in health-promoting behaviors. If online cognitive
training regimens that confer generalized beneﬁts are developed in
the future, the ability to promote sustained and intensive engagement with them will be crucial to realizing their full beneﬁts.

Appendix A.
Table A1.

Table A1
Mean daily exercises as a function of partner’s lagged exercises.
Atomistic
Altruistic
Cooperative/Competitive
Partner’s exercises today (pt )
Atomistic × pt
Altruistic × pt
Cooperative/Competitive × pt
Partner’s exercises t − 1 (pt−1 )
Atomistic × pt−1
Altruistic × pt−1

10.62**
(3.82)
2.64
(4.38)
8.73*
(3.56)
0.01
(0.05)
0.03
(0.07)
0.13*
(0.06)
0.06
(0.06)
0.06
(0.03)
−0.05
(0.05)
0.10
(0.06)
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Table A1 (Continued)
Cooperative/Competitive × pt−1
Partner’s exercises t − 2 (pt−2 )
Atomistic × pt−2
Altruistic × pt−2
Cooperative/Competitive × pt−2
Partner’s exercises t − 3 (pt−3 )
Atomistic × pt−3
Altruistic × pt−3
Cooperative/Competitive × pt−3
Constant
R2
N

0.05
(0.04)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.003
(0.05)
0.02
(0.05)
0.008
(0.04)
0.091*
(0.04)
−0.06
(0.05)
0.00
(0.05)
−0.03
(0.05)
9.01***
(1.68)
0.19
12,168

Notes: This table examines how an individual’s exercise completion relates to the
current and previous exercise completion of their partner (other pair in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment). The table reports results of an OLS regression of
exercises completed on indicators for experimental condition, the number of exercises completed by the individual’s partner on the current day and three previous
days, and interactions between the treatments and the lagged exercise completion.
The unit of observation is the participant-day. Standard errors clustered at the level
of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is
clustered at the level of the group.
***
Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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